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Alain Badiou’s Suturing of the Law 
to the Event and the State of 
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Antonio Calcagno 
King’s University College, Canada 
If one reads closely Alain Badiou’s essay “The Three Negations,”1 one 
cannot but be struck by his discussion of negation and how it clarifies the 
appearing and (in)existence of the event. The logic of Badiou’s three 
negations explain how events make existents and inexistents appear in 
different degrees, ranging from the most intense appearings and 
(in)existences, which mark the significant change constitutive of events, to 
the milder, non-apparent shifts, to false or fictional shifts, which Badiou calls 
paraconsistent appearings.  The relationship between law and events 
follows the logic of the three negations:  
So the relationship between law and event is intelligible 
only if we clearly distinguish the three different meanings 
of negation. A truth, as a set of consequences of a change, 
is certainly transgressive in a classical context. But if the 
context is intuitionistic, the world continues with the same 
general laws, with some differences in their application. 
And if the context is paraconsistent, the change is only a 
fiction.2  
Most revealing in Badiou’s discussion of law and the event is the intimate 
connection between them. Badiou never sees the law as an event in and of 
itself; rather, the law is structured by the event itself. The rupture of an event 
creates a new subjectivity and a new time, all of which radically break with 
preceding established orders or regimes.  Events reorganize situations, both 
material and historical. Law, viewed as an element in the set of multiple 
elements that constitute an event, is subject to the logic of the event: the 
intensity of the event directly conditions the very intensity of or the degree 
of the existence or appearing of the law.  The stronger and more forceful the 
event, the greater the transgressive intensity of the law.  For example, the 
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French Revolution, understood as an event, breaks with an old and no 
longer tenable monarchical view of the world. The French Revolution 
overturns monarchic rule and law with new laws, introduced by both 
Robespierre and Saint-Just. Badiou remarks:  
For many sophisticated reasons, I name a Truth, or an 
evental-truth, the multiplicity composed of these 
consequences. So we can say that a truth, in a first sense, is 
a part of the world, because it is a set of consequences of 
the event in the world, and not outside. But in a second 
sense, we can say that a truth is like a negation of the 
world, because the event itself is subtracted from the 
rational or conventional laws of the world. We can 
summarize all that in one sentence: A truth is a 
transgression of the law. “Transgression” first signifies 
that a truth depends on the law, and second is 
nevertheless a negation of the law.3 
In Badiou’s account of the event, we can say that that the law is sutured to 
the event. We could even say that law, understood always within the 
specific contexts of events, is an element of most event-sets. In other words, 
wherever and whenever an event occurs, one will always find a 
transgressive element of the law. 
 I am sympathetic to this view, and I believe that Badiou has captured 
an important aspect of events with his discussion of law. But I wonder if we 
can even posit a more radical desuturing of the law from the event: Can 
radical shifts in law produce events? Can the law itself be an event, thereby 
conditioning the very nature of the event itself, creating a new subjectivity 
and a new time?  I would like to argue that the law can do so. How? Badiou 
begins “The Three Negations” by discussing the work of the German jurist 
Carl Schmitt.4 I would like to argue that the state of exception, as elaborated 
by Carl Schmitt, can serve as the willed decision of a sovereign that brings 
about an event.  We can understand the sovereign as a kind of legal subject 
who has the force to bring about a new event, thereby rupturing with an 
established order and introducing a new form of subjectivity and time.  
 
Law and the Event 
Bruno Bosteels make clear that the concept of law is used in various senses 
in Badiou’s work.5 He indicates that we see the law operating in Badiou’s 
early work, The Theory of the Subject, and that we also see it in Badiou’s later 
work. Bosteels shows how the notion of the transgressive law is reworked 
through Badiou’s engagement with Lacan. If we accept my earlier claim that 
the law is sutured to the event, just as time and the subject are6, then we can 
see how the events of mathematics/science, poetry/art, politics and love all 
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establish new laws, all of which intensely appear and contradict and break 
down old established regimes of law. Think of the new laws introduced by 
Gödel (incompleteness) and Cantor (numerable and non-numerable 
infinities), which changed the way we understand logic and mathematics. 
Lacan’s reformulation of the laws of desire changed the way we understand 
love, and massive political events, for example, May ’68, produced radical 
changes in how we viewed law. Finally, the poet Mallarmé changed the laws 
of poetics. Given space limitations, it is impossible to discuss the law in each 
of the four principal categories of events that Badiou has established, so I 
would like to focus on political events.  It is here that I believe we can 
illustrate most forcefully how the law itself can become an event.    
 According to Badiou, a political event comes about when three 
conditions have been met.7 First, there has to be a radical rupture with a 
given situation: a political event breaks from an established political regime 
or order.  Second, a political event requires that there be forceful pressure, 
usually understood as State-pressure, which oppresses a political order or 
situation. The event pushes against State-pressure and reacts against it. The 
implication is that there is usually a forceful and often violent reaction 
against an existing regime that marks the coming to be of an event. Referring 
to Carl Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction as the origin of politics, Badiou 
maintains that the distinction must be understood as a multi-faceted 
negation. He argues that there are many different degrees and ways to 
understand the difference between the friend and the enemy: 
As you know, for Carl Schmitt, the very essence of politics 
is to clearly distinguish between friend and enemy. But 
finally, the difficult question is the relationship between 
the two, precisely when the distinction is clear. Even in the 
case of war, the question of this relationship is a complex 
one. And this complexity is the complexity of the action of 
negativity. For example, in a foreign war, you must often 
destroy the forces of the enemy, and destruction is 
certainly the most radical form of negation. But in many 
civil wars, it is unclear whether the goal is to destroy the 
enemy, which is a part of your country, or only to 
dominate it, like in the class struggle, for example. In this 
case, the negation of the enemy is not in the radical form 
of destruction, even if civil wars can sometimes be more 
bloody and cruel than foreign wars. Another example: 
You can know that a country is your enemy, sometimes in 
a strong sense, and nevertheless be allied to this country 
against another enemy more dangerous in the pure 
present, even if the first enemy is more dangerous in the 
future.8 
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Finally, a political event is collective: it has to involve a collectivity of 
individuals in order for it to work. Badiou develops his theory of the event 
in his Logics of Worlds by reminding us that all events have an affective 
dimension. He lists four kinds of affects that can accompany events:  anxiety, 
courage, justice, and terror.9 
 In order to explain the relation between law and the event, Badiou 
distinguishes two primary senses of law. There are the laws that regulate the 
order or regime of elements that constitute a particular set that comes into 
being through the decision of an event. These general laws, to borrow 
Badiou’s own description, help order the relations between things that 
constitute a multiplicity. He remarks:  
In my own ontology, a thing is a pure multiplicity without 
any qualitative determination. The general laws of a world 
are not laws of the things themselves. They are laws of the 
relations between things in a determinate world. I name 
the inscription of a pure multiplicity in the relational 
framework of a world its “appearing” in this world. So, all 
laws, physical or biological or psychological, or juridical, 
are laws of appearing in the context of a singular world. In 
this context, a thing not only is as a pure multiplicity, but 
also exists as an object in the world. This distinction 
between being qua being and existence, which is also a 
distinction between a thing and an object, is fundamental. 
Always remember that a multiplicity is as such, in a 
mathematical or ontological context, and exists, or 
appears, in a concrete world.10 
General laws of a set allow the arrangement of elements to appear in the 
order that they exist within a set.  
 There is, however, a second sense of law, the transgressive sense, 
which marks the rupture of the decisive event that gives birth to a new 
order, time and subject. Here, a new law comes upon an established regime 
in order to bring about a new order. Fidelity to the event and the 
transgressive law of that event allows for the event to persist through time. 
Badiou will often refer to revolutions to illustrate his ontology of the event. 
The Russian Revolutions, just like the French Revolution, displaced a Tsarist 
order or lawfulness with a revolutionary one. The event of the Russian 
Revolutions not only created a new epoch or time but also new subjects (the 
revolutionary socialist/communist subject) and a new order of law—a new 
lawfulness emerged with the Russian Revolutions. It should be remarked 
that the event itself never is present or appears in the way that its ordered 
elements appear. The event stands out of the set, though it structures the set: 
the event is the ultra-one of the set that constitutes the event itself.  
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 The practice of law is illuminating for Badiou because it opens up 
logical possibilities of understanding how events work. He notes that in the 
practice of the law, for example, that between guilt and innocence, there 
exist many possible verdicts:  
So, if the great field of the law is always a concrete world, 
or a concrete construction, its logic is not classic. If we take 
“law” in its strict legal sense, we know that perfectly well. 
If the sentence P is “guilty,” and non-P “innocent,” we 
have always a great number of intermediate values, like 
“guilty with attenuating circumstances,” or “innocent 
because certainly guilty, but with insufficient proof,” and 
so on.11  
The practice of law demonstrates that there are degrees of difference 
between decisions. Badiou mines these differences in order to discuss how 
events can order a multiplicity of elements belonging to a situation or how 
they can displace the order of a preceding event.  
 Events can rupture a given order in very intense, transgressive ways 
or in less intense, less immediate ways. In addition to the intensity of events, 
Badiou argues that there are apparent changes or shifts that resemble events, 
but, in fact, are merely fictions or non-events. The law of an event (not the 
general sense of the law of the material, historical situation consisting of 
general multiplicities) is never an ultra-one, like the event itself. Again, the 
law emerges with the event. Badiou describes the event as a sudden change 
in the rules of appearing: “Today, and for you, I simplify the matter. I 
suppose that an event is a sudden change of the rules of appearing; a change 
of the degrees of existence of a lot of multiplicities which appear in a 
world.”12 Because an event can only be grasped in retrospective 
apprehension and never at the moment that the event occurs, there are 
certain signs or indications that an event has truly occurred. One of these 
signs is the intensity of a change of the appearing of something that was 
previously inexistent and which now appears with greater intensity. Badiou 
uses the examples of the revolutionary worker and the artistic event:  
The crucial point is the change of intensity in the existence 
of something the existence of which was minimal. For 
example, the political existence of poor workers in a 
revolutionary event; or the formal existence of abstract 
figures in a modern artistic event, and so on. I name an 
“inexistent” of a world a multiplicity which appears in 
this world with the minimal degree of intensity, 
something which, in this world, appears as nothing. The 
question for an event is: what is the destiny, after the event, of 
an inexistent of the world? [emphasis mine] What becomes 
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of the poor worker after the revolution? Are abstract 
figures, which before the artistic event were not acceptable 
in a work of art, now essential means of creation?13  
The discussion of lesser and greater intensity is understood as a test which 
ultimately can allow us to determine whether or not an event has truly taken 
place.  
 There exist three possible degrees of intensity or negations that permit 
one to know whether an event has taken place or not. The maximum degree 
of intensity is marked by a radical and transgressive change of an 
established order. In such events, the inexistent comes to appear with great 
force and in a new light. Badiou describes the maximum intensity of an 
event in the following way:  
First, the strength of the change is maximal. The test is that 
among the consequences of this change, we have the 
maximal value, the maximal intensity of existence, for an 
object which was an inexistent, which appeared with the 
minimal degree of intensity. The poor worker, who before 
the revolution appears as nothing in the political field, 
becomes the new hero of this field. The abstract painting, 
which was purely decorative before an artistic revolution, 
becomes an essential trend of the history of arts, and so 
on.14  
Badiou describes maximal intensity of the event as contradictory: the event 
contradicts a given order.  
 A second possible degree of intensity is described as intermediate:  
Second possibility: the strength of the change is 
intermediate, neither maximal, nor minimal. The test is 
that the inexistent takes an intermediate value, more than 
minimal, less than maximal. The poor worker appears in 
the political field, but it is not at all a new hero of the field. 
The abstract figures can be used in painting, but they are 
not really important. In this case, the logical framework of 
the event, and of its consequences, is clearly intuitionistic. 
There is no obligation for the event to be of maximal 
intensity. In fact, we can have a new intermediate value 
for the inexistent with the same value for the event. The 
strength of the event is not a fixed one. So the event is 
substitutable by other moderate changes. Between this 
event and the sad “nothing happens,” there exist a lot of 
different possibilities. We can say that a revolutionary 
politics is classical, but a reformist politics is intuitionistic. 
I name this change a weak singularity. That is: something 
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happens, but without radical effects, and in the general 
respect of the hierarchy of degrees of appearing in the 
world.15  
In the intermediate intensity, small changes may happen, but they do not 
contradict or upset an established order. The possibilities that emerge in this 
intuitionistic intensity are manifold, but no single change ruptures the 
established order. Hence, Badiou’s description of maximal, intense change 
as revolutionary and intuitionistic change as reformist. Reformist politics 
and, hence, reforms of the law, may modify certain elements within an 
established regime, but the given order is still faithful to the logic of a more 
originary event. For example, modifications of laws and the modification of 
the U.S. Constitution are in and of themselves not revolutionary: they are 
faithful, understood in the Badiouan sense of fidelity, to the event of the 
American Revolution and the law, time and subjectivity that emerge 
contemporaneously with this event.  
 The last kind of negation is marked by complete lack of intensity of 
appearing of the inexistent. Badiou calls this kind of negation 
“paraconsistent.” He remarks:  
In the third case the strength of the change is not 
perceptible at the level of the inexistent. After the change 
the degree of existence of all inexistents of the world is 
always minimal. The poor worker is nothing more in the 
political field than a poor worker, abstraction is always 
nothing in regard to representation and so on. Here the 
logical framework is paraconsistent. Why? Because we can 
have a sort of indecidability between event and non-event. 
Yes, something happens, but, from the point of view of the 
world, everything is identical. So we have event and non-
event simultaneously. And there are no new values 
between affirmation and negation, because the world is 
exactly the same. The principle of excluded middle is true, 
the principle of contradiction is false; so we have a 
paraconsistent logic. We say then that we have a false 
event, or a simulacrum. The lesson is that, when the world 
is intuitionistic, a true change must be classical, and a false 
change paraconsistent.16   
The emphasis here is on the indecidability of the inexistent: its intensity is 
not fully apparent. Badiou claims, that something has happened, but we are 
unsure of its effect on the inexistents.   
 Whether the change is revolutionary (logic of contradiction), reformist 
(intuitionistic logic) or abstract (paraconsistent logic), the law comes to 
manifest itself, also in degrees and according to the intensity of the change 
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or negation, as that which gives logical coherence or order to the events—an 
intelligible lawfulness that we can seize in retrospective apprehension. 
Remarkable in Badiou’s analysis is his understanding of law as a kind of 
logic of negation. The law establishes an order. Again, it should be remarked 
that this view of law and intelligible lawfulness can be seen already, as 
Bosteels points out, in Theory of the Subject as well as in Being and Event.  In 
“Meditation 20”, Badiou discusses the naming of the event. Naming is 
fundamental for Badiou, but he reminds readers that though naming is 
important, naming (and hence the descriptors) attached to the event is not 
identical to the event itself. To reduce the event to its name and descriptors 
is “illegal” for Badiou because the event itself can never fully appear, that is, 
the event itself is unrepresentable.17 The law, always understood within the 
logic of appearing, allows us to test and verify the legality or illegality of an 
event. In this sense, the law is sutured to the degree of the appearing and 
non-appearing of the event.   
 
On the Possibility of the Event of Law 
I must confess that I am sympathetic to Badiou’s understanding of the event 
and the legality and illegality it establishes. When we look back at the 
French Revolution, one of Badiou’s favorite examples, we can see how it 
establishes revolutionary change as it contradicts monarchical rule and law, 
yet we also see, though time and fidelity to the event that has been named 
the “French Revolution,” a series of intuitionistic reforms and even 
paraconsistent changes that stem from the contradictory logic of this 18th 
century event. The work of Sylvain Lazarus shows us how this might 
happen when we consider the legacy of the French Revolution in history 
and the law.18 Although the law is conditioned by the event here, I wonder 
whether there can be another place for the law in Badiou’s philosophy: 
Could the law itself be an event and, furthermore, if the law is an event, can 
it contradict the very logic of the event itself? In other words, with respect to 
my second question, can the law, understood as an event, establish another 
kind of logic, intensity of appearing or negation? The implication of my first 
question bears on a reconsideration of Russell’s paradox concerning the 
relationship of the set of all sets to the sets that it contains.  
 Badiou begins his article on the law and the three negations with a 
reference to the friend-enemy distinction made by the German jurist Carl 
Schmitt. Schmitt also meditates long and hard on the precarious nature of 
the law and explains the implications of this precariousness for the modern 
state, which, as Locke notes, sees rule by law as the foundation of the state. 
Locke tells us in his Two Treatises of Government (see chapter 13, paragraph 
158) that salus populi suprema lex. Schmitt makes two important observations: 
first, the sovereign is the one who can exempt himself from the law, that is, 
the sovereign is the individual or agent that can exempt itself from the rule 
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of law—of course, for Schmitt, there can be no modern rule by law without a 
sovereign19; second, in parliamentary liberal democracies, the law can 
always be challenged, perhaps not always in a given moment, but as time 
unfolds and as other precedents are established, even laws confirmed by the 
Supreme Court can be challenged, rejected or modified.20 Schmitt’s state of 
exception, I believe, has the potential to play itself out in terms of the 
contradictory logic of the event.  The German Revolution of 1918 that helped 
established the constitution of Weimar Germany made provision for a 
democratic, republican and federalist state—a state that maintained the 
primacy of law within a parliamentary liberal democratic model of 
governance. Schmitt argued, against the Nazis and prior to the Nazi 
takeover in 1933, that a simple majority could not serve as a legitimate 
means to undo basic principles of constitutional rule.21 Even Schmitt’s view 
of the dictator requires some kind of identification of the dictator with the 
people/community, which was not the case in 1933, as there was significant 
opposition to Hitler. The event that made National Socialism possible, that 
gave birth to its totalitarian aspirations, was the contradiction of Weimar 
constitutional law and the state of exception of the law that was later 
invoked once Hitler “legitimately” seized power. It was these two 
fundamental moments, the seizure of government rule though the law and 
its eventual suspension, leading to the establishment of a new sovereign, 
namely, Adolf Hitler, that gave rise to other constituent moments of the 
event that we call fascism or Nazism. It would be a mistake to think that 
Nazism or fascism is a dead historical moment. It is an event because we see 
today how various Nazi- or fascist-identified movements throughout 
Europe (for example, Golden Dawn in Greece, Fiamma Tricolore and Forza 
Nuova in Italy, along with Nazi identified local parties in east Germany) are 
surging and growing. These are not paraconsistent or intuitionistic 
appearings; rather, they are faithful adherents to the event we call fascism, 
an event that ruptured the way we understand and see politics.22 
 The case of Hitler, understood as the use and abuse of constitutional 
law and the invoking of the sovereign state of exception, is a most 
interesting case when it comes to Badiou’s claims about the law, for we have 
here a clear appearing where the contradictory changes of the law can be 
understood under the logic of the event as described in Badiou’s essay on 
the three negations. The contradiction is two-fold. First, according to 
Schmitt, there is a contradiction of the legitimate fundamentals of the 
Weimar constitution and, second, there is a sovereign state of exception, 
both of which produce a revolution—a revolution that truly altered, and 
viciously so, the order not only of Germany and Europe, but the whole 
world. Millions were systematically exterminated as they were considered 
non-humans: Jews, homosexuals, Roma, Communists, for example. The law 
was used to justify the extermination of these innocent persons and justify 
the pursuit of global domination. We see the extension of the use and abuse 
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of law by criminals like Eichmann, who argued, at least according to Arendt, 
that his defense of following the law was thoughtless and introduced for the 
first time on a massive scale the possibility of what she calls “the banality of 
evil.”23 Giorgio Agamben is the contemporary philosopher who 
understands the impact of the event of the state of exception. His discussion 
of bare life in Homo Sacer points out the novelty of the contradiction 
introduced by Schmitt’s theory of law and its totalitarian exercise in and 
after the collapse of Weimar Germany.24 What was radically changed by the 
rise of fascism was the way we viewed human rights and our colossal failure 
to observe and protect them. Roberto Esposito makes the case that National 
Socialism changed the relation between life and politics: life now has now 
become the province of politics, especially biological life.25 
 If the radical and contradicting negations introduced by the state of 
exception can be understood as an event of law, what are the implications 
for Badiou’s theory of law?  I argue that the law need not only be sutured to 
the event, as time and the subject are insofar as they are extensions of the 
decision that gives rise to the event, but the law itself is a curious example of 
an event that can certainly be a set of all sets (i.e., the event of the modern 
sovereign state of exception) that can be contained within the specific sets 
that constitute what Badiou calls the intensities, appearings or negations of 
the law.  Even though we name the state of exception as an event, it can 
never fully appear, yet it conditions very particular constitutive sets and 
elements of sets that form the event we can generally call National Socialism.  
Badiou himself never discusses National Socialism as an event, but he 
certainly would see Mao’s and Stalin’s Socialist revolutions as events.  From 
an Arendtian perspective, one has to ask why Badiou, perhaps 
disingenuously so, especially given his own logic, resists the extension of the 
logic of the event to revolutions of the right. I think this gap betrays perhaps 
Badiou’s own hope for the possibility of a revolutionary politics that can 
produce new worlds of genuine political life. This being an admirable hope, 
we still have to concede that his logic of the event also runs the risk of 
producing ugly and hateful revolutionary change, as evidenced by the 
lawful sovereign state of exception that gave rise to Hitler’s national 
Socialism, which still has faithful followers today.  
 If the decisive enactment of the sovereign state of exception of Adolf 
Hitler can be considered an ultra-one, an event, albeit a miserably tragic one, 
why can we not say that it simply is a political event? Does this sovereign 
state of exception not meet the criteria for being considered a political event 
as discussed above? It would appear that three criteria have been met: 
collectivity, reacting against state oppression, and massive or contradictory 
change. But I would argue that the sovereign state of exception is more than 
just a political event: it changes the very nature of the logic of Badiou’s 
argument. Because the sovereign state of exception is a legal possibility, the 
law and the event, not only intensely appear, but they also clearly appear. In 
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other words, the sovereign state of exception is the one case where the event 
itself appears precisely because of its explicitly legal formulation and 
enactment.  The sovereign state of exception, seen as an event of law, is a 
case where the ultra-one becomes clear because its naming and explicit 
enactment are fully present. The event itself appears and can be named as a 
one, as an identity. 
 The foregoing claim about the identity of the one of the sovereign state 
of exception contradicts Badiou’s own licit and legal descriptions of the logic 
of the event as ultra-one. This is true, but though there is a radical shift in 
the appearing of the event itself in this case, however, the specific 
arrangement and multiplicity of elements included in the sets forming the 
event called the National Socialist sovereign state of exception of 1933 
become both discernible and indiscernible. Hannah Arendt makes the case 
both in the Origins of Totalitarianism and in Eichmann in Jerusalem that the 
violent and deadly rise of fascism affected and involved, willingly and 
unwillingly, seemingly disparate and contradictory elements, for example, 
the complicity of certain Jews and allied powers in the betrayal of the Jewish 
people. No one is above guilt and reprimand in Arendt’s analysis: she 
highlights massive contradictions and inconsistencies in the arrangement 
and relationships of sets of actors, persons and groups who one would think 
would be one side or another of the conflicts produced by the sovereign 
state of exception that was National Socialism and Stalinism.  
 The sovereign state of exception of 1933, if we concede that it is an 
exception to the general logic of Badiou’s concept of the event, inverts the 
structuring and appearing of the event and its constituent elements or sets. 
Because the sovereign state of exception makes itself clear in a legal and 
lawful manner, its ultra one status becomes identifiable and one. The force 
and power of the ultra one as standing outside of its sets of elements while 
ordering or regimenting them is no longer in the state of exception itself; 
rather, the sets of constituting elements admit a more intense form of 
simultaneous and coexisting indiscernibility and discernibility, a 
contradictory and intense appearing of seeming inconsistencies that adhere 
with one another, even though they appear inconsistent: Jews betraying 
Jews, Allies cooperating with the Enemy, friends dealing with enemies, to 
borrow from Carl Schmitt’s concept of the political. When the law itself can 
become an event, we have an exception to the logic of the event insofar as 
the event’s ultra one is displaced: the event itself becomes a one and its 
constituent multiplicities of regimented sets and content become both 
discernible and indiscernible, consistent and inconsistent: they appear as an 
ultra one, that is, they are not easily identifiable as a specific, situated 
element: they transcend an easy identification as this or that element.  
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